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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Before us is a petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) vacating and reversing an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) finding that
Petitioner Shoumin Chai (“Chai”), a native of China, was eligible for withholding of
removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act, § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii), and for relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”), art. 3, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988),
1465 U.N.T.S. 85. Because we find that the BIA correctly determined that Petitioner
failed to demonstrate that she was eligible for withholding of removal or relief under the
CAT, we will deny the petition for review.
I.
Because we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and
procedural history of this case, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
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analysis. Chai, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, received a legal
education there and graduated from Maritime College in 1982, receiving special training
in maritime law. For the next five years, she was employed as a manager in the claims
department of China Ocean Shipping Company (“COSCO”), a state-owned company. In
1987, Chai was sent to the United States by COSCO and the Chinese Government. She
obtained a J-1 exchange scholar visa to work for a law firm in New York and Houston,
enabling her to study the American legal system in depth. This training was undertaken
so that COSCO would have a better understanding of how its claims were handled in the
United States. Chai signed an agreement to return to China and to employment with
COSCO following her training in the United States.
After completing her training, however, Chai obtained the permission of the
Chinese government to obtain an LL.M. in Maritime Law from the University of Houston
Law School before her return to China. About one month before her graduation from law
school, in April, 1989, pro-democracy protests broke out in China. In early May, Chai
was contacted by a friend in New York, who was organizing Chinese student protests in
the United States. He invited Chai to participate in planned protests outside the Chinese
consulate in Houston. She did so twice, first at the end of May, 1989, and again on June
5, 1989, one day after the massive crackdown on Tiananmen Square. Chai claims that
the officials at the consulate obtained her photograph and identifying information at the
time of these protests.
Chai received her LL.M. degree on May 13, 1989. Shortly thereafter, she was
ordered by the Chinese consulate in Houston to return to China immediately. She replied
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that she could not return as she was still working on her thesis. Chai also sought, and
received, permission from the Chinese government to remain in the United States for an
additional year to practice law. She was scheduled to return to China in August, 1990.
Chai did not officially return to China. Instead, she remained in America where
she sought, and obtained, lawful permanent resident status in 1990.1 Chai, however, did
return to China clandestinely for ten days in August, 1990, with the assistance of friends
in the Chinese embassy in Washington, D.C., and another friend in the customs office in
Beijing, to visit her ailing father.
Around this time, Chai unsuccessfully attempted to renew her Chinese passport.2
Her attempts were rebuffed because she had remained in the United States without
permission from the Chinese government.
In March, 1990, she inquired about her situation from a friend, Mr. Di, who was a
high official in COSCO, during a secret meeting in Spain. Mr. Di informed her matterof-factly that she would be unable to get a passport, because she was involved in a protest
at Tiananmen Square and failed to return to China in accordance with her agreement with
1

In her brief, Chai claims that she obtained this relief under the Chinese Student
Protection Act. This, however, is impossible, as this Act was not passed until 1992. Pub.
L. No. 102-404, 106 Stat. 1969. It is likely that Chai obtained this relief pursuant to
Exec. Order No. 12,711, 55 F.R. 13897 (1990), issued by President George H. W. Bush
on April 11, 1990, which had essentially the same effect, deferring deportation of
Chinese nationals who were in the United States between June 5, 1989, and April 11,
1990, and waiving the requirement that J-visa holders must return to their home country
for at least two years before attempting to return or seek permanent resident status in the
United States.
2
The official transcript of her hearing indicates that this attempt occurred in 1992.
However, it does not fit with her travel to Spain in March, 1990. It is not clear which
date is correct, and it is possible that the court reporter misheard the dates, as other dates,
such as Chai’s date of birth, are misstated in the transcript.
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the Government and COSCO. Chai’s brother, also a COSCO employee, was not
permitted to travel outside of Chinese waters in his work, and her sisters were likewise
denied exit permits.
While she was living in the United States, Chai developed a gambling addiction.
To facilitate this addiction, she engaged in illegal behavior. On March 10, 2006, Chai
pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, one count of theft by deception and one count of
theft by unlawful taking. She was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment on each count,
the terms to run concurrently.
On June 20, 2006, Chai was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), as an alien convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not
arising out of a single scheme of criminal conduct, and under 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. On October 5, 2006,
Chai filed an Application for Withholding of Removal under the INA and for
Withholding of Removal under Article III of the Convention Against Torture.3 On
February 15, 2008, after hearing extensive testimony, the Immigration Judge granted her
application for Withholding of Removal. The Department of Homeland Security
appealed this decision to the BIA, which sustained the appeal on July 17, 2008, reversing
the decision of the IJ. The BIA ordered that Chai be removed from the United States.
She now petitions for review of the BIA decision.
II.
3

The Government argues that Chai waived any claim that she had under CAT by
failing to raise the issue in her brief. It is clear, however, both from her Appellate Brief
and from the record below, that Chai has preserved her CAT claim.
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A.
This appeal presents difficult questions concerning jurisdiction and whether the
BIA applied an incorrect standard of review in determining Chai’s credibility.4 We need
not, however, resolve these thorny issues. Although INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(C) deprives this Court of appellate jurisdiction over any final order of removal
concerning an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, we nonetheless would have
jurisdiction when an alien whose claim is otherwise unreviewable raises “constitutional
claims or questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Even assuming arguendo that
Chai has indeed raised a question of law, however, and accepting on its face her
argument that the BIA applied an incorrect standard of review to the IJ’s decision, we
nonetheless conclude that the BIA did not err in concluding that the evidence presented
by Chai was insufficient to warrant relief.
B.
To be eligible for withholding of removal, Chai must show that it is “more likely
than not” that, if deported, she will be persecuted on account of her race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. Lukwago v.
Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir. 2003). The standard is the same for relief under the
CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16.
Chai did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she is more likely than
not to suffer persecution if she returns to China. Chai has not apprised us of any case in
which an individual involved in two isolated protests related to the Tiananmen Square
4

The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b).
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incident has been persecuted so many years after the fact. Indeed, the evidence Chai cites
indicates quite the opposite. For example, Chai cites the U.S. State Department Report
for China, which found that while “[d]ozens of political activists have been arrested over
the past decade for . . . political activities, such as advocating . . . a reappraisal of the
1989 Tiananmen Massacre,” (A. 478), “the farther back in time an applicant’s political
involvement, the less likely he or she is to face reprisal from the government.” (A. 479.)
Specifically, with respect to protesters from the 1989 Tiananmen Democracy Movement,
“Chinese authorities have claimed that all Tiananmen cases have been resolved, but they
have not provided a credible accounting . . . . Individuals suspected of ongoing
involvement in activities commemorating those killed in the Tiananmen Square massacre
are subject to harassment and sometimes detention.” (A. 480.) (emphasis added). This
distinction is further emphasized in the Report. While the Report notes that “many
students and scholars claim that their political activities in the United States, such as
demonstrating at . . . Chinese consulates . . . would prompt security authorities to target
them for punishment on their return to China,” and that “[s]ome claim that their families
in China have been harassed as a result of their political activities in the United States,”
(A. 481), the Report gives as a relevant example the situation of an individual who was
involved in organized Chinese protest groups in America. (A. 481-82.) Chai does not
fall into that category.
Moreover, other evidence offered by Chai, such as the alleged persecution of her
relatives, including her brother who is also employed by COSCO, may be equally
attributable to her failure to return to China after having been sponsored to come to the
7

United States to receive legal training to benefit her company and country.5 Indeed, the
chronological relationship between the Chinese government’s request for Chai’s return,
its refusal to grant a new passport, and the government’s likely mounting expectation that
Chai would return to share her newly-gained knowledge and training with her
compatriots supports this conclusion. Any retribution on the basis of Petitioner’s failure
to adhere to her contractual obligations does not warrant relief. See Lukwago, 327 F.3d at
182.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the BIA.

5

We also note that the IJ found that Chai’s testimony regarding her family’s
persecution was likely “embellish[ed],” (A. 19), an adverse credibility determination that
was never reversed by the BIA.
8

